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bstract: Claims of indigenous minori-
ties to land are a significant political
issue in many parts of the world. These
claims, though, are contested, be it in theoretical,
political or legal terms. I consider a position, put
forward by Jeremy Waldron, that asserts some
theoretical reservations towards indigenous mi-
norities' claims to reparations and land. Waldron
seems to assume that indigeneity is no important
factor regarding land claims and reparative issues.
I propose a rivalling account of indigenous land
claims, based on the idea of self-determination.
Self-determination itself can be understood in two
diﬀerent ways, it can either be conceived as a form
of political autonomy or sovereignty, or it can be
understood as having pre-political property
rights.*
Introduction
Political issues regarding indigenous or natio-
nal minorities are arguably amongst the most
burning ethno-political concerns throughout
the world. The history of slavery, colonialism
and imperialism, the emergence of nation
states and power politics had fatal consequen-
ces for many cultural groups in every part of
the world. As Lars-Anders Baer, president of
the Saami parliament in Sweden, indicates in-
digenous minorities have for a long time been
“the wretched of the earth”1 when it came to
ethno-cultural or economic justice. Things
may have changed, at least to some degree, du-
ring the last years.2 In international law at least
indigenous minorities have, after decades of
struggle, gained recognition and a juridical
basis to make their interests heard.3
Issues regarding indigenous minorities, apart
from concrete legal and political considerati-
ons, also raise interesting philosophical questi-
ons. In this essay, I would like to scrutinise one
of them. I will, most generally, be interested in
indigenous minorities' claims to land, i.e.
claims to their traditional territory of settle-
ment. Through the history of colonialism and
imperialism, diﬀerent groups that we today
refer to as indigenous peoples, aborigines, first
nations etc, lost their traditional homelands to
the new settlers. Throughout the world—or at
least where the interests of indigenous minori-
ties are not completely denied or ignored—
claims to regain rights to this land seem to be
at the heart of indigenous peoples' political
struggles.
One of the main aims of this essay is to scruti-
nise what is at stake when we speak about in-
digenous land claims.
Put diﬀerently, the
main question is: how
should we understand
indigenous claims to
land? In a first step, I
will sketch a recently
presented position by Jeremy Waldron that
takes indigenous land claims to be fundamen-
tally problematic. They are, Waldron holds,
confronted with some grave theoretical flaws.
In a second step, I will then outline an alter-
native account on indigenous land claims,
drawing on the axiomatic idea of self-determi-
nation. I will thus outline a possible under-
standing of indigenous land claims on other
grounds than the ones presented by Waldron.
Thus, I will propose a possible interpretation
of what rationale might underlie indigenous
land claims. I argue that by claiming land,
what is actually aspired is self-determination in
the broadest sense. Self-determination itself
can be understood in two diﬀerent ways, it can
either be conceived as a form of political auto-
nomy or sovereignty, or it can be understood as
having pre-political property rights. Self-de-
termination in the first sense means amplified
political influence, self-government and auto-
nomy. Ownership over a certain piece of land
does not convey any such political recognition.
It just includes rights to use, management etc.
Thus in its second sense, self-determination is
reached by pre- or extra-political ownership
rights in the land. In my definition, political
rights can be granted independent of owner-
ship rights, just as ownership rights can be
granted independent of any political rights. We
can, now, interpret some indigenous land
claims as claims to the ownership of land.
Ownership of the claimed land might confer
self-determination independent of any political
status.4
This interpretation, then, might also be im-
portant in more general discussions on repara-
tive justice—not just regarding land claims.
The account presented might help to under-
stand what the (political and economic) inju-
stice committed against indigenous peoples
consisted in.
How to understand indigenous land claims?
One point of access to the understanding of
Indigenous minorities' claims to land
by Daniel Weyermann
A
Land: A part of the earth's surface, considered as property. 
The theory that land is property subject to private ownership and
control is the foundation of modern society, and is eminently
worthy of the superstructure. 
/ Ambrose Bierce /
Dear Reader,
Your opinion matters!
We want to improve the Intergenerational 
Justice Review with your input. 





Phone +49 6171 982 367
Fax +49 6171 952 566
E-Mail: editors@igjr.org
Please tell us of any friends to whom 
we can send one trial issue free of cost. 
JFG_08_04_1  08.02.2009  19:43 Uhr  Seite 23
indigenous land claims is the notion of indi-
geneity. Thus, we might ask: what qualifies in-
digenous peoples to make such claims? Or, as
Waldron puts it: “what is important about in-
digeneity?”5 In a recent article, Jeremy Wald-
ron scrutinises this question “with regard to the
issue of the remediation of injustice”.6
He proposes that there are basically two ideas
or principles that underlie the notion of indi-
geneity. It is them that make indigenous land
claims—or claims to reparations—morally ap-
pealing. Indigeneity, he holds, is “defined rela-
tive to a given territory and the special
relationship to the land (...)”.7 Depending on
how one conceives indigeneity more precisely,
two fundamental ideas linked to the notion
can be distinguished. The first idea refers to
“preexisting entitlements”8 to land that have
been disrupted. In this case, indigeneity is mo-
rally important regarding land claims because
it invokes what Waldron calls the “Principle of
First Occupancy”.9 This principle holds, in a
nutshell, that the first individual or group that
occupies a piece of land becomes its owner. In
the light of this principle, indigenous peoples
have a right to the claimed land because they
were first—and, one might add, because it has
been wrongfully taken from them by subse-
quent settlers.
Sometimes, speaking about indigeneity, the
focus is not put on first occupancy but rather
on prior occupancy. That brings us to the se-
cond possible principle that may underlie the
notion of indigeneity in Waldron's analysis.
This principle holds that indigeneity is morally
important because it implies that “a prima facie
right to be left undisturbed and allowed to de-
velop according to its own dynamic”10 has been
disrupted. This is what Waldron calls the
“Principle of Established Order”.11
As Waldron argues, neither of these principles
makes the idea of indigeneity very appealing as
both of them bear some grave theoretical pro-
blems.12 Consider the Principle of Established
Order. As an inherently conservative principle
based on a human interest in security and sta-
bility, it may help to condemn injustices
against an established order at one point in
time. At the same time, however, the principle
could also help to justify established orders that
have been founded on exactly the same inju-
stices. Following Waldron, all that matters re-
garding the Principle of Established Order is
that there is such an order, not how it came
into being. An obvious diﬃculty with this
principle therefore is that the mentioned prima
facie right to be left undisturbed counts for
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every established order—also the one that is
established now and has disrupted indigenous
peoples' orders at some point in time. If indi-
geneity refers to the Principle of Established
Order, it therefore does not add anything in-
teresting to land claims by indigenous
peoples.13
Even though Waldron does not state it more
explicit, it seems to me that his analysis comes
down to the upshot that indigeneity does not
add anything interesting to the assessment of
land claims. Put diﬀerently, for him, the fact
that the claimant is an indigenous people is not
morally interesting or significant, since he
thinks the underlying principles are flawed.14
This proposition, though, is at least counterin-
tuitive. Morally speaking, it seems to be quite
a diﬀerent matter if claims to a traditional
Sioux reservation in the USA are put forward
by the indigenous Sioux Nation or, let us say,
a European company. It matters for the moral
legitimacy of a land claim if the current occu-
pier’s ancestors were the very first settlers, or if
they themselves occupied the place. Intuitively,
at least, the land claims by the Sioux Nation in
our example have a wholly diﬀerent and more
appealing moral character than hypothetical
land claims by a European company. If indige-
neity would not add anything morally inter-
esting to land claims, however, why would
intuitions diﬀer so heavily regarding these two
examples?
As the example just stated suggests, Waldron's
account might be incomplete or miss an im-
portant point about the idea of indigeneity.15 I
try to show that a rationale underlying indigen -
ous land claims is the idea of self-determina-
tion – and not, as Waldron suggests, First
Occupancy and Established Order.
Indigenous minorities' claims to land as
claims to self-determination
Self-determination, political autonomy and
ownership
Indigenous minorities' claims to land16 are re-
actions to historical or ethno-cultural injustices
that have hindered (and continue to hinder)
members of these groups “from fully realizing
the values of being a member in the group”.17
Since these peoples once mainly lived self-de-
termined and according to their own customs,
with their own institutions and rules, these
claims can be understood as claims to regain
such self-determination. Thus, in a first step, I
conceive self-determination as “the right of a
group or people to be collectively self-govern -
ing”.18 Compared with Waldron's Principle of
Established Order, self-determination seems to
be more encompassing. Self-determination
does not only invoke a temporal stability of an
order; but it stresses the value of the societal
culture19 for its members and the interest of the
members to be collectively self-governing re-
garding this order.
Indigenous land claims, though, do not have
to be understood as reactionary claims to a
state of aﬀairs as it was before the indigenous
people were incorporated into another political
entity. Most of the time, anyway, this would
not be a viable option. The influence of mo-
dernity has had an impact on traditional ways
of life, changing indigenous cultures pro-
foundly just as it has changed other societal
cultures too. However, these land claims hint at
the injustices suﬀered by indigenous peoples,
and the self-determination lost over “econo-
mic, social and political development”.20
Furthermore, it can be argued that nations
have a right—at least a prima facie one—to
self-determination as a condition for just in-
ternational and ethno-cultural relations.21
Since indigenous peoples can—with reference
to their societal cultures—be conceived as na-
tions, this reasoning also holds with respect to
indigenous minorities. On these grounds, it
seems right that self-determination should be
granted to indigenous minorities.22 In short, if
peoples, nations and nation states do have the
right to self determination, so do indigenous
minorities.
It is, however, far from clear what  self-
determin ation could mean exactly, and what
would be the best way to achieve it.23 In one
way, these claims to land as claims to self-de-
termination are most straightforwardly under-
stood as claims to political autonomy, i.e.
self-government. Political autonomy, as I con-
ceive it here, can mean a wide range of things.
Understood in a strong sense, it could mean
political independence and secession from the
actual state into which indigenous peoples
have, often by force, been incorporated.24 Or it
could mean some form of increased regional
influence. This could be achieved through the
 formation of something like a distinct sub-so-
vereign entity that could become a department
of, or enter a federation with, the formerly en-
compassing state.25
A weaker form of political autonomy could be
reached by strengthening regional influence,
for instance by enforced regional participation
in decision making. There may, from case to
case, be various options available, but it seems
clear that diﬀerent aspects would have to be
considered in assessing which one may be just
and viable; not only the interest of the indige-
nous people, for instance, but also of other
groups, the concerned state(s) etc. In short, po-
litical autonomy can be reached in a number of
ways. But all of them have to guarantee that
the indigenous group gains a certain political
status or influence, so that it would be repre-
sented more adequately in the national or in-
ternational political sphere of nation states.
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In another fashion, however, the claims to self-
determination could be understood not so
much in terms of political organisation or
inter- and intra-national relations, but rather
as claims to something like “prepolitical rights
of property”26. In this view, self-determination
is not conceived in terms of a political status
within a broader established political order.
Rather it is seen as a, presumably, more funda-
mental or first-order right to the territory
where the indigenous minority lived—as a
group and community of memory27—long be-
fore any (mainly) alien political system has
been imposed from the outside. Nils Oskal
makes a similar point when he states that “[in-
digenous peoples' right to land and water use]
(...) can be discussed in principle as a separate
question from the issue of political participa-
tion rights for indigenous people in the gene-
ral state governmental right”.28 From this point
of view, claims to land are claims for the resto-
ration of a people's traditional homeland for
their own use, management etc. This can be
seen as a necessary condition to pursue many
aspects of their distinct and unique lifestyle,
features that may be reasons for the members
to ascribe intrinsic value to their societal cul-
tures.29 The restoration of this property is, in
other words, “understood as a precondition
that enables the members of the group indivi-
dually and collectively to fully realize the value
of group membership”.30 In the context of the
Saami in Northern Europe, for instance, we
might think about traditional forms of noma-
dic reindeer herding and pastoralism.31 Indi-
genous minorities are conceived as societal
cultures, just as other nations are; but they are
furthermore societal cultures with a (traditio-
nally) strong bond to the homeland that they
occupied longer than the actual nation states
have existed.32 Therefore, the control over this
land in ownership terms might be a viable op-
tion to grant self-determination to indigenous
minorities.
An objection: the inseparability of political and
pre-political claims
After having drafted a possible view on indigen-
ous minorities and self-determination, I would
now like to bring up a problem of the dicho-
tomic interpretation of self-determination as
stated here: that the claims to a political status
or to the ownership of land seems to be inher-
ently intertwined. The problem is, concretely,
that it is diﬃcult to imagine political self-go-
vernment that is not linked to some kind of
ownership of land. In turn, a claim to property
rights of land seems hollow when not linked
to some stronger, political claim. How could
we say, for instance, that a state is politically
autonomous and sovereign when the territory
of this state is owned by, let us say, the
neighbour state? There is a strange tension bet-
ween the notions of self-government and
ownership: ownership can, after all, also be un-
derstood as a kind of sovereignty, just as sover-
eignty of a state seems to imply ownership of
the state territory.
This problem, however, is probably one of ca-
tegorical confusion. Sovereignty, or political
self-government, is—as I conceive it here—a
term linked to a political status that may in-
volve the power to decide, to rule etc. It is lin-
ked to a state or another political entity that
manages this political power. Ownership, on
the other hand, has nothing to do with a poli-
tical status. It is in this sense “prepolitical”33
that it does not necessarily have something to
do with political organisation. It can thus be
distinguished as something in its own right.34
After all, the individual or collective ownership
of a thing can meaningfully be distinguished
from any kind of political power over the
thing.
Note, however, that I conceive the distinction
between political and pre-political not as a
temporal one. Rather, it indicates that there are
diﬀerent domains or realms. The political do-
main is constituted through political entities
such as nation states, the pre-political domain
is constituted independent of the political do-
main and concerns moral rights. As Jacob T.
Levy states: “If we think that Aborigines (and
other indigenous peoples) had rights to their
land before colonization, rights that the colo-
nists and colonial states were wrong to violate,
then we are committed to the idea that justice
and injustice in property relations are in some
sense pre- or extrapolitical.”35
We can thus distinguish between political
claims, i.e. claims to political autonomy in
whatever form, and pre-political claims in the
sense that they refer to a right that exists inde-
pendently of any political order. As an illustra-
tion, consider John Locke's well-known
account of rights and property, where property
can be acquired before any civil state is orga-
nised—even though this does, in his view, not
count for indigenous peoples.36 This view of
property, as something pre-political and in this
sense natural, is also stressed by many liberta-
rians and other theorists of natural rights.
Whether this is an adequate view on property,
and a defensible one, is another question that
I cannot treat here. However, it is important
to note that this is in fact the view, as Levy
states, that seems to underlie indigenous mi-
norities' claims to land—at least if we under-
stand them as claims to the ownership of land.
It seems important to acknowledge, for the ju-
stifiability of these claims, that the property in
the land existed before settlers, kingdoms and
nation states created it; and that indigenous
peoples also have natural, i.e. pre-political
rights. This is a view that was not shared by
Locke. It is a pejorative view on indigenous
cultures that underlies his account of property.
It is an account that can be understood as a
method of dealing with the abundances of the
‘unowned’ land in America.37
Nevertheless, the view that there are pre-poli-
tical rights does not imply that the two aspects
of self-determination proposed do not relate to
each other at all. Levy, for instance, deduces a
right to self-government from the pre-political
right to ownership: “given a view that indige-
nous peoples had and have rights to their own
land, and that they had and have rights of free-
dom to practice and maintain their own
ways—[for] indigenous minorities self-gov -
ernment is justifiable (...).”38
Therefore things might not be so clearly dis-
cernible as I have suggested earlier. However,
the only point that I would like to make here
is that it makes sense to consider political au-
tonomy and ownership as two aspects of self-
determination that are interesting on their own
account. Even though they might be—even
fundamentally—linked in one way or another.
If seen as a theoretical abstraction and to gain
a focus on the autonomy or property aspect of
claims to self-determination, at least, the pro-
posed dichotomy should be acceptable.
Outlook: Self-determination through ownership
of land and a rationale for reparations
If one treats the whole problem of indigenous
land claims in terms of self-determination, a
richer account on why indigenous peoples are
claiming land becomes available. By introdu-
cing the idea of self-determination, the two
principles proposed by Waldron and presuma-
bly invoked by indigeneity—the Principle of
Established Order and of First Occupancy—
are conceivable in a new light. To narrow the
issue of indigenous land claims on these two
principles does no justice to such claims. To
conceive the problem in more general terms of
political autonomy and ownership seems to
provide a more adequate understanding of in-
digenous land claims. Linked to the idea of
self-determination, indigeneity thus remains
Intergenerational Justice Review
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an interesting and important idea regarding
land claims.
This understanding of indigenous land claims
can, furthermore, also be important regarding
the discussion of reparations for indigenous
peoples. Investigating the rationale of indige-
nous land claims might help to formulate ade-
quate reparative measures on a material level.
Notes:
* I would like to thank the Reviewers of this essay for the in-
teresting and helpful commentaries and suggestions. Many
thanks also to Hanna Lukkari for time and thought spent on
these pages.
(1) Baer 2005: 248, and Fanon 2004.
(2) Kymlicka 2001c: 121 states: “there have been dramatic
developments in international law regarding indigenous
peoples in the last two decades (...).” See also Baer 2005:
248-251.
(3) United Nations 2007.
(4) Note that these interpretations are conceived of as mere
theoretical possibilities. I do not say that indigenous peoples
do in fact understand their claims in one way or the other.
I would rather say that both interpretations of the claims are
possible and plausible ones. How indigenous minorities do
actually conceptualise or conceive land claims is another
question that is not treated here.
(5) Waldron 2007: 24. In what follows, I will consider Wald-
ron's account of the notion of indigeneity in Waldron 2007.
I limit my investigation to Waldron's explicit conceptual
analysis of indigeneity in Waldron 2007, despite the fact that
Waldron's extensive work on related topics would deserve
more attention than I accord it here. Since this essay is not
intended to be a commentary on all of Waldron's theses, I
think it is defensible to limit the scope of investigation in
the way I do.
(6) Waldron 2007: 24.
(7) Waldron 2007: 28 (emphasis in the original).
(8) Waldron 2007: 29.
(9) Waldron 2007: 30.
(10) Waldron 2007: 31.
(11) Waldron 2007: 31-37. The crucial diﬀerence between
these two principles thus is that “the Principle of First Oc-
cupancy looks to the dawn of time, to the moment at which
the land in question was first taken peacefully into human
use and possession” whereas the Principle of Established
Order rather “looks to what was happening at a moment
just before the present, just before the first European ships
came over the horizon” (Waldron 2007: 31). The second
principle does not, furthermore, “delve into tangled histori-
cal questions about any status quo ante”, but rather “recog-
nizes the opacity of the past” and “prohibits overturning
existing arrangements irrespective of how they were arrived
at” (Waldron 2007: 31). However, it is questionable if this
distinction is well-founded. When the first Indians arrived
in North America, coming from Asia over the Bering Strait,
they settled down and established an order. A settlement
 without some kind of order is unthinkable. It thus could be
argued that Waldron’s distinction is an artificial one. I thank
one reviewer for this point.
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(12) Waldron 2007: 32-37.
(13)  Waldron 2007: 32-33.
(14) This, at least, is what I assume Waldron says. I base this
interpretation on the account in Waldron 2007: 32-37,
especially the conclusions regarding the underlying princi-
ples of indigeneity on p. 33 and 37.
(15) Of course, it is also possible that the intuitions in favour
of the Sioux have nothing to do with indigeneity but derive
from some completely diﬀerent sources. But the example
nevertheless suggests that the idea of indigeneity might still
be a pertinent idea to assess our intuitions regarding cases
such as the one of the Sioux. 
(16) Note that I am talking about self-determination of
groups or collectivities, not of individuals. I am thus con-
cerned with self-determination on an inter-group level, i.e.
self-determination of societal cultures regarding other so-
cietal cultures. That is, between an indigenous minority and,
let's say, the group of new settlers.
(17) Meyer 2001: 286. Regarding the importance of this
value, see Meyer 2001 in general.
(18) Moore 2003: 89: “self-determination is usually under-
stood as the right of a group or people to be collectively self-
governing.” Now we might want to discuss whether groups
can be bearers of rights and what the consequences of such
a conception of rights would be. This, however, is not at all
the aim of this essay. It is true that I assume that groups can
be bearers of rights and can be moral and legal agents. If one
is not ready to accept this premise, a lot of what I put for-
ward may seem very odd. For a discussion on groups as right
bearers, see for instance Kymlicka 1995, p. 34-48, and Kym-
licka 2001c.
(19) As Kymlicka 2001a: 53 states, to speak of societal cul-
tures means that there is “a set of institutions, covering both
public and private life, with a common language, which has
historically developed over time on a given territory, which
provides people with a wide range of choices about how to
lead their lives”. 
(20) Control over these aspects is, according to the United
Nations, an international right of nations. See United Nati-
ons 1966b: part I, art. 1, sec. 1.
(21) Consider the Human Rights standards: “all peoples
have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development.” See Uni-
ted Nations 1966b and United Nations 1966a: part I, art. 1,
sec. 1.
(22) When we speak of self-determination and societal cul-
tures, it also seems to makes sense to introduce the notion
of nation. First of all, nations are usually conceived in simi-
lar terms as Kymlicka's societal cultures (see Kymlicka
2001c), therefore indigenous minorities can—in most
cases—be referred to as societal cultures or nations. Consi-
der also the fact that indigenous peoples are sometimes re-
ferred to as first nations. Secondly, the notion of
self-determination is often used in the context of nations or
international relations, speaking e.g. of national self-deter-
mination. Speaking of nations in this context therefore
seems to be fruitful and justifiable.
(23) Note that in what follows, I do not propose any sub-
stantial analysis of the notion of self-determination, auto-
nomy or ownership. Rather, I indicate possibilities of how to
link indigenous land claims to the notion of self-determi-
nation, i.e. how to interpret  indigenous land claims in terms
of self-determination. In a further step, a more thorough in-
vestigation of these notions for the given context would be
desirable.
(24) For a discussion of this option, see Meyer 2001: 286-
290. For a critical position toward this option, see Horowitz
2003.
(25) For a favourable analysis of the latter option to gain po-
litical autonomy, see Kymlicka 2001b.
(26) Levy 2003: 133.
(27) For a discussion of the notion, see Meyer 2001: 263-
269.
(28) Oskal 2001: 258.
(29) Meyer 2001: 270-271.
(30) Meyer 2001: 288.
(31) Beach 1994: 151-155.
(32) This may, however, no longer be the case with all indi-
genous minorities—due to forced population transfers or
aggressive settlement policies, for instance. For considerati-
ons in this direction, see Levy 2003: 120.
(33) Levy 2003: 133.
(34) As Eide 2001: 138, states: “establishing sovereignty over
a territory does not in itself mean that the state becomes the
owner of land in the private law sense of property rights.
Admittedly, sovereignty can give the state a right to establish
for itself private property in land if there are not other prior
rightful owners. This would imply that the territory is held
to have been terra nullius, in the sense that it belonged to
no one, when the state asserted its ownership.”
(35) Levy 2003: 133.
(36) Locke 2003: chapters II and V.
(37) Locke 2003: §49: “In the beginning, all the world was
America (...).”  According to Locke, therefore, when “a Swiss
and an Indian” encounter each other “in the Woods of Ame-
rica” (Locke 2003: §14) they meet as if in the state of nature.
For an overview on Lockean property theory and its links
to colonialism, see Armitage 2004 and Tully 1993.
(38) Levy 2003: 133.
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